The Jurisprudence of  As Though : Democratic Dialogue and the Signed Supreme Court Opinion by Bozzo, Peter
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Volume 26
Issue 2 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities Article 3
January 2014
The Jurisprudence of "As Though": Democratic
Dialogue and the Signed Supreme Court Opinion
Peter Bozzo
Yale Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh
Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation




The Jurisprudence of "As Though":
Democratic Dialogue and the Signed
Supreme Court Opinion
Peter Bozzo*
I am not so nafve (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be una-
ware that judges in a real sense "make" law. But they make it as
judges make it, which is to say as though they were 'finding' it-
discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is today
changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.'
-Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia
On March 23, 1999, Supreme Court Justice Stephen G. Breyer commit-
ted a major breach of etiquette: he used the word "I."2 Justice Breyer's
singular pronoun attracted public scrutiny because it occurred not in a cas-
ual conversation or personal anecdote, but rather in a Supreme Court ma-
jority opinion.' Typically, a Justice who authors a majority opinion speaks
in the first person plural; "we" is the pronoun of choice, with "I" reserved
* Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2015. I am grateful to Linda Greenhouse for her mentorship and
guidance in the development of this Note. I am also thankful to the editors at the Yale Journal of Law
& the Humanities, whose suggestions have benefited the piece immensely.
1. James M. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment).
2. Tony Mauro, Courtside: Breyer[ ]s I Scream, LEGAL TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1999 [hereinafter Mauro,
I Scream], http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005513434&slretum=20130322234028; Tony
Mauro, Justice's Supreme Use of "I" Sparks a Legal Frenzy, USA TODAY, Apr. 2, 1999, [hereinafter
Mauro, Supreme Use], https://secure.pqarchiver.com/USAToday/access/40230189.html.
3. Mauro, I Scream, supra note 2; Mauro, Supreme Use, supra note 2.
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for concurrences or dissents. 4 Yet when the Court handed down its deci-
sion in South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Alabama, Justice Breyer's
unanimous opinion contained the prohibited pronoun.5  The incident
sparked what one journalist called a "legal frenzy,"6 and a prominent law
professor-Mark Tushnet, then of Georgetown University Law Center-
sent a note to Justice Breyer, expressing dismay at the opinion's loose lan-
guage.7 In his reply, Justice Breyer assured Professor Tushnet that "I
(we?) promise correction," and the official version of the case in the Unit-
ed States Reports contains no trace of the singular pronoun; "I" surrepti-
tiously morphed into "we. As Professor Barry Friedman aptly summa-
rized the bizarre incident, "[i]t's like the Wizard of Oz stepping out from
behind the curtain." 9 For a moment, the Justices had given the public a
glimpse behind the united front of a unanimous opinion, hinting at the in-
dividual author behind the Court's words.
The attention generated by Justice Breyer's slip-up illustrates a mild
contradiction in the way the Court conducts its business. The majority at-
tempts to speak with one voice, but it chooses an individual Justice to ex-
press that voice. The creation of a majority opinion is undoubtedly a col-
laborative process, and the author frequently modifies drafts based on her
colleagues' suggestions."o Nonetheless, when the Justices hand down an
"Opinion of the Court," it is labeled as the work of a single author. This
process might seem to be the result of an administrative imperative; the
Court needs to produce a collective decision, and it makes sense-simply
as a matter of efficiency-for one person to write the opinion. But a puz-
zle remains: why does the Court label its opinions as the product of one
author? In other words, why do the Justices not publish their decisions as
4. Mauro, I Scream, supra note 2 ("No one was certain whether it was completely unprecedented,
but no one can remember ever seeing 'I' in a majority opinion in the modem era."); Mauro, Supreme
Use, supra note 2 ("Normally, court opinions use 'we' or no pronoun at all."). Notably, in the very
same case in which Justice Breyer's "I" drew public scrutiny, Justice O'Connor used "I" three times in
a two-sentence concurrence. S. Cent. Bell Telephone Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 171 (1999)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote "I" twice in his own two-
sentence concurring opinion. Id. at 171 (Thomas, J., concurring).
5. Mauro, I Scream, supra note 2; Mauro, Supreme Use, supra note 2. The offending sentence
read, "In Richards [v. Jefferson County], we considered an Alabama Supreme Court holding that state-
law principles of res judicata prevented certain taxpayers from bringing a case (which I will call Case
Two) to challenge on federal constitutional grounds a state tax that the Alabama Supreme Court had
upheld in an earlier case (Case One) brought by different taxpayers." See Bell Telephone, 526 U.S. at
167.
6. Mauro, I Scream, supra note 2.
7. Mauro, I Scream, supra note 2; Mauro, Supreme Use, supra note 2.
8. Bell Telephone, 526 U.S. at 167; Mauro, I Scream, supra note 2.
9. Mauro, I Scream, supra note 2; Mauro, Supreme Use, supra note 2.
10. See James F. Spriggs II, Bargaining on the US. Supreme Court: Justices' Responses to Ma-
jority Opinion Drafts, 61 J. POL. 485 (1999), for an analysis of how Justices negotiate with one anoth-
er in the crafting of majority opinions. See also Linda Greenhouse, What Would Justice Powell Do?:
The "Alien Children" Case and the Meaning of Equal Protection, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 29, 36-46
(2007), for an example of how this collaborative process influenced the Supreme Court's opinion in
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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"Opinions of the Court" without identifying the specific writer? Widening
the lens to consider concurrences and dissents, a broader question emerg-
es: why does the Court issue signed opinions at all? Like Justice Breyer's
use of "I," concurring and dissenting opinions draw back the curtain on
the Court, revealing the nine individual Justices who comprise the collec-
tive judicial body."
Responding to these concerns, Owen Fiss has powerfully defended
signed opinions on the ground that they enhance the Court's legitimacy:
[One] aspect of the legitimating process . . . [is] the obligation of a
judge to engage in a special dialogue-to listen to all grievances,
hear from all the interests affected, and give reasons for his deci-
sions. By signing his name to a judgment or opinion, the judge as-
sures the parties that he has thoroughly participated in that process
and assumes individual responsibility for the decision. We accept
the judicial power on these terms ... 12
In other words, courts maintain legitimacy to the extent that they engage
in dialogue with litigants, lawyers, and the American public. The Justices'
signatures are their assertion that they take this dialogue seriously.
Fiss's comment rings true in the realm of American jurisprudence,13 but
it immediately raises questions in the comparative context. Courts in many
civil law countries-such as France, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands-prohibit signed opinions (as well as separate concurrences
and dissents),14 yet these nations' courts do not appear to have difficulty
11. Chief Justice Roberts has suggested that separate opinions undermine the Court's institutional
integrity. During his confirmation hearings, then-Judge Roberts stated, "The Supreme Court speaks
only as a court. Individually, the [J]ustices have no authority. And I do think it should be a priority to
have an opinion of the [C]ourt." Hearings on the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr. to be ChiefJus-
tice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 303 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation Hearings] (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.,
Nominee for Chief Justice of the United States).
12. Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1443 (1983).
13. But see Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court's Cult of Ce-
lebrity, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1260 (2009) (urging Congress to enact a statute prohibiting
signed opinions in the Supreme Court); James Markham, Note, Against Individually Signed Judicial
Opinions, 56 DUKE L.J. 923, 942-950 (2006) (claiming that the elimination of signed opinions would
prevent the "Justices' individual personae (from] eclips[ing] their collective institutional role"); Craig
S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Precedent Bound?, NAT'L REV. (Mar. 6, 2006, 8:28 AM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/216969/precedent-bound/nelson-lund (arguing that the elimi-
nation of signed opinions, coupled with other reforms like the removal of law clerks and the reintro-
duction of circuit-riding, would "make our Court less adventurous and more respectful of precedent").
14. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 146 (1990).
For further discussion of the civil law tradition of unsigned opinions, see, for example, MITCHEL DE
S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRANSPARENCY AND
LEGITIMACY 13 (2009); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, EVOLUTION OF THE JUDICIAL OPINION: INSTITUTIONAL
AND INDIVIDUAL STYLES 179 (2007); and Markham, supra note 13, at 938. For further discussion of
the civil law tradition of prohibiting separate dissents and concurrences, see M.D. Kirby, Judicial Dis-
sent-Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, 123 L.Q. REV. 379, 382 (2007). In addition to the
countries listed in the text, Germany prohibited dissenting opinions until 1970. John Ferejohn &
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maintaining public approval. 5 As a result, civil law opinion-writing prac-
tices provide a rich source for comparative analysis, offering insights into
how judicial systems maintain legitimacy in the absence of individually
authored opinions. The Cour de Cassation, France's highest civil court,'6
is a particularly fruitful site for comparison because its opinions present a
dramatic counterpoint to American judicial writings. The French court's
decisions are unsigned, separate concurrences or dissents are forbidden,
and opinions are written in a formalist, 7 terse style that contrasts with the
more discursive tone of the Supreme Court's judicial rhetoric.' 8
In the absence of the Fissian legitimacy that emerges from signed opin-
ions, the Cour de Cassation maintains credibility by functioning like a bu-
reaucracy.' 9 It is hierarchical: its judges adopt a modest tone that expresses
their deference to the legislature, which is regarded as the supreme law-
giver in the French political system. Its work is driven by expertise: judges
undergo a rigorous training program that prepares them for a life of civil
service. And it produces rules: the Cour's opinions read more like a set of
agency regulations than like the outcome of a judicial process. By con-
forming to societal expectations about the role of courts vis-Ai-vis legisla-
tures, drawing on formal training, and crafting definitive rules, French ju-
rists establish themselves as constrained and credible legal experts. The
Cour's formalist, unsigned opinions further enhance the sense that its
judges are drawing on legal knowledge and not simply imposing their per-
15. See, e.g., LASSER, supra note 14, at 331-37 (offering a theory about how the French judicial
system maintains legitimacy in the absence of signed opinions).
16. See infra Part LA for a brief description of the structure of the French judiciary.
17. "Formalism" is a term that comes loaded with the weight of previous analyses and critiques.
In this Note, I will use "formalism" to refer to a judicial style that does not treat decisions as if they
reflect underlying value judgments; formalist judges view themselves as strictly applying the law to
the facts at hand. Following Cass R. Sunstein, "formalism" in this sense
entail[s] three commitments: to ensuring compliance with all applicable legal formalities
(whether or not they make sense in the individual case), to rule-bound law (even if application
of the rule, statutory or contractual, makes little sense in the individual case), and to constraining
the discretion ofjudges in deciding cases.
Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 638 (1999).
18. Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 133-34. See also JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW
410 (1968) ("In [its] highly technical and laconic style the Court of Cassation surpasses all others.").
19. Building on the archetypal Weberian conception of the term, I define "bureaucracy" as an
institution possessing the following six characteristics:
(1) [J]urisdictional areas are clearly specific with rules defining the regular activities of person-
nel as official duties; (2) the organization is arranged hierarchically with supervision of subordi-
nates by superiors, but the scope of superiors' authority is circumscribed; (3) a system of ab-
stract rules governs official actions, these rules are stable and can be learned, and official
decisions are recorded in permanent files; (4) the means for carrying out administrative func-
tions (such as equipment and privileges) belong to the office not the officeholder, and personal
property is demarcated from official property; (5) officials are selected on the basis of technical
qualifications, appointed rather than elected, and compensated by salary; (6) employment in the
organization is a lifetime career, with the employee (after a trial period) gaining a tenured posi-
tion with salary protection, protection from arbitrary dismissal, and a pension after retirement.
Robert Alleman & Jason Mazzone, The Case for Returning Politicians to the Supreme Court, 61
HASTINGs L.J. 1353, 1362-63 (2010).
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sonal values on the French populace. In this sense, far from undermining
the Cour de Cassation's legitimacy, unsigned opinions promote the bu-
reaucratic norms that justify the French judiciary's authority.
The Supreme Court's signed opinions demonstrate a fundamentally dif-
ferent set of commitments. In the United States, where students are taught
since elementary school that the judiciary is a co-equal branch of govern-
ment, extreme deference to the legislature is not a significant source of le-
gitimacy-and might, in fact, be viewed as an abdication of the Court's
obligation to perform judicial review.20 In addition, American judges do
not receive nearly as much specialized preparation as their French coun-
terparts, which means that training programs do not confer the same sense
of authority that they do in the French system. Instead, the judicial opinion
itself is the primary source of the Court's legitimacy: it is the expression
of the Justices' rationales, the outcome of their deliberations, and their
missive to the American public. The Court draws its authority from the
depth of its reasoning, the quality of its writings, and its ability to convinc-
ingly articulate the public values that underlie its decisions. Since value
articulation depends less on legal expertise than on political 21 Commit-
ments, the Court's legitimacy does not depend on its adoption of bureau-
cratic norms. In many ways, the Justices must eschew the trappings of bu-
reaucracy, acting not as mechanistic, interchangeable administrators but as
adjudicators 22 whose personal values matter a great deal. Under this con-
ception, Justices' signatures amount to their assurance that they have pro-
duced a high-quality, legally sound, morally defensible opinion. Whereas
bureaucratic norms justify unsigned opinions in the Cour de Cassation, the
ideal of value articulation justifies signed opinions in the United States'
highest court.
In the past two or three decades, however, encroaching bureaucratiza-
tion at the Supreme Court has begun to undermine the justifications for
signed opinions in the American context. The Justices increasingly come
from similar backgrounds and have undergone similar types of legal train-
ing; if they are viewed as jurists who primarily draw on legal expertise (ra-
ther than personal values), their identities may not matter, and their opin-
ions may not need to bear their signatures. As the Supreme Court
increasingly bureaucratizes-as it comes to resemble the Cour de Cassa-
tion-it correspondingly undermines the justifications for signed opinions.
20. Note that the Cour de Cassation does not have the authority to declare acts of Parliament un-
constitutional; that power is reserved to the Conseil Constitutionnel. See infra Part l.A.
21. "Political" is here distinguished from "partisan." A political commitment is a preference for a
particular policy outcome or set of values; a partisan commitment is an attachment to a particular po-
litical party. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 31, 76 (2005).
22. Throughout this paper, I use the term "adjudicative" to indicate that the judicial process in-
volves making a judgment-in this instance, a value judgment-about how to decide a case.
2014] 273
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This mismatch between the rationales for signed opinions and the reality
of increasing bureaucratization gives rise to a deeper critique of the Su-
preme Court's opinion-writing practices: signed opinions may not even
achieve the objectives to which they are ostensibly committed. As Fiss
notes, signing an opinion amounts to a Justice's assurance that she has ful-
ly engaged with the case. The signed judicial opinion is the opening shot
in a dialogue among the Court, the litigants, the legal academy, the other
branches of government, and the American public. This dialogue would be
undermined by unsigned, French-style opinions, which are so opaque that
they give the public few openings to engage with the Cour's reasoning.
Yet this conventional understanding of the unsigned opinion is an impov-
erished one. The Justices' willingness to transparently articulate public
values-to fill in all the blanks in their opinions by expounding on their
reasoning-creates the sense that their views are authoritative.23 The opin-
ion becomes the final word on the subject rather than the opening volley.
Under this conception, the Cour de Cassation's opaqueness becomes an
asset. By leaving much unsaid, judges generously open up space for legal
academics and French citizens to fill in the blanks, promoting national
conversations about legal controversies.
The debate over signed and unsigned opinions emerges from a funda-
mental tension that defines all judicial work-the tension between staying
true to the traditional formulation of the judiciary's role (applying the law
to the facts) and maintaining transparency (openly expressing the value
judgments that underlie some legal arguments). This is the challenge that
Justice Scalia articulated in the epigraph to this paper: the gap between the
judicial obligation to "find" law and the need to acknowledge that it is not
always there to be found. The American and French judicial writing styles
represent characteristically divergent responses to this dilemma. The
French approach involves a sharp separation between the act of "applying"
the law-a task reserved for judges-and the act of expressing values that
underlie legal decisions-a task confined largely to academic discourse.
The Supreme Court takes a different tack. In its opinions, it attempts to
both "apply" the law and convey the public values underlying its deci-
sions. In other words, the French Cour de Cassation, much more than its
American counterpart, achieves Justice Scalia's ideal. The Cour's judges
employ the jurisprudence of "as though," acting as if they were finding
law even when they are, in fact, reshaping and developing it. The counter-
intuitive conclusion of this Note is that, in doing so, the Cour de Cassation
23. See Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 167 (1985) (describ-
ing courts' "formulaic" style of opinion writing, in which judges employ "apparently definitive formu-
lations" to reach conclusions); id. at 184 ("The simple announcement of a judgment (no matter how
unsatisfactory in other respects) is generous to the reader, for it allows room for other judgments."); id.
at 190 (describing the comprehensiveness of judicial opinions, in which "[n]early any criticism or
doubt is sufficiently important to deserve a reply, if only in a footnote").
[Vol 26:269274
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may be facilitating public engagement in a way that the more comprehen-
sive, transparent-and signed-Supreme Court opinion never could.
I. THE COMPARATIVE CONTEXT
Since the birth of modem comparative law in the early twentieth centu-
ry,24 American legal scholars have been almost united in their assessment
of the French judicial system: it is the embodiment of civil law-style judg-
ing, in which judges are anonymous administrators tasked merely with ap-
plying the legislature's Code.25 In this view, civil law jurists conform to
the Montesquieuian ideal: "[T]he national judges are no more than the
mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings incapa-
ble of moderating either its force or rigor."26 A quick perusal of French ju-
dicial decisions seems to confirm this assessment. The Cour de Cassa-
tion's opinions self-consciously emphasize that they are merely applying
the legislative Code. Most decisions are less than a page long and consist
of a series of "whereas" clauses that relentlessly lead to what is portrayed
as the inevitable conclusion.27 Because the decisions are so brief, a repre-
sentative opinion bears reprinting in full:
THE COURT:-On the only issue:-Given art. [article] 1382 c. civ.
[Civil Code];-Whereas the author of a [tort] is responsible for the
complete reparation of the damage that he has caused;-Whereas, ac-
cording to the decision under appeal (Court of Appeals of Rouen, 2d
chamber, 25 June 1992), Mrs. Annick X was hit and injured by the
automobile of Mr. Y while riding her bicycle; Whereas Miss Cathe-
rine X, acting on her own behalf and on behalf of Mrs. Annick X, her
24. PETER DE CRUZ, A MODERN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 12 (1993) ("Modem compar-
ative law is usually recognised as having begun in 1900 at the International Congress of Comparative
Law held in Paris, where the first serious and organised attempts were made to formulate the functions
and aims of comparative law.").
25. E.g., DAWSON, supra note 18, at 415 ("The central conviction [of modem French law], which
still lies deep, is that judges cannot be lawmakers; from this the conclusion seems to follow that they
have no responsibility for shaping, restating and ordering the doctrine that they themselves produce.");
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE} 36 (1997) ("[Tlhe official story
[of the civil law version of adjudication] is that the role of the judge is to apply the relevant Code to
the facts of the case using a presumption of gaplessness [i.e., that the text of the Code covers every
possible factual situation that could arise]."); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 39 (1969)
("[The civil law judge's] function is merely to find the right legislative provision, couple it with the
fact situation, and bless the solution that is more or less automatically produced from the union.");
ALEC STONE SWEET, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 26 (1992) ("The judge's role in [France's] fragmented but centralized
system is subservient and bureaucratic . . . . The codes, being clear, literal expressions of sovereignty,
must by treated [by judges] as providing a series of sovereign commands binding upon the whole of
the body politique [sic].").
26. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU (CHARLES DE SECONDAT), THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 209 (David Wal-
lace Carrithers ed., Thomas Nugent trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1977) (1748); see also MERRYMAN,
supra note 25, at 38 ("The [civil law] judge becomes a kind of expert clerk.... The net image is of the
judge as an operator of a machine designed and built by legislators.").
27. DAWSON, supra note 18, at 407; LASSER, supra note 14, at 30.
2014] 275
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mother, brought suit against Mr. Y and his insurer, the Norwich Un-
ion Co., the Elbeuf primary medical insurance fund, and the Elbeuf
Transport Company for reparations;
Whereas, in denying Mrs. X reparations for her personal injury, the
[appellate court] decision stated that, according to its expert, the vic-
tim, who is reduced to a vegetative state, is absolutely unable to feel
anything at all in the way of existential concerns, be it pain, or the
sentiment of diminution due to disfigurement, or the frustration of
[life's] pleasures; Whereas the appellate court thereby deduced that
there was insufficient proof of general damages; Whereas, by so de-
ciding, although the vegetative state of a human being does not ex-
clude any type of indemnification, the damages must be repaired in
full, and the court of appeals thus violated the above text;
On these grounds, quashes [the appellate decision], but only with re-
gard to the issue of the personal injury of Mrs. X, and remands the
case to the Court of Appeals of Paris. 28
The opinion begins by referring to the relevant provision of the Code,
suggesting that the remainder of the reasoning follows directly from that
provision ("Given art. 1382 . . .").29 The statement of facts is straightfor-
ward and vague. The reader learns only that a male driver hit a female bi-
cycler, who then fell into a vegetative state. 30 The legal reasoning in the
second paragraph is even more opaque. The court simply states-without
justification or elaboration-that "the vegetative state of a human being
does not exclude any type of indemnification" and that "the damages must
be repaired in full."3 The decision provides little guidance for lower court
judges who will have to apply the holding and calculate damages. Because
the French judiciary does not attach significant weight to precedents, the
opinion mentions no prior cases,32 and the judges do not make any effort
28. For the original opinion in French, see Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial
matters] 2e civ., Feb. 22, 1995, Bull. civ. II, No. 61 (Fr.). For the translated version used in the text,
see LASSER, supra note 14, at 31.
29. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Feb. 22, 1995, Bull. civ.
11, No. 61 (Fr.).
3 0. Id.
31. Id.; see LASSER, supra note 14, at 32 ("The judgment's legal analysis is, if anything, even less
satisfying [than the statement of facts].").
32. The French Code of Civil Procedure forbids judges from using precedents as the sole basis for
their legal conclusions. CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 455 (Fr.). See also DAWSON, supra
note 18, at 407, 414-15 ("In the opinions of the Court of Cassation what is mostly missing is any refer-
ence whatever to prior decisions, either its own prior decisions or those of any other court."); LASSER,
supra note 14, at 36-37 ("[T]he Cour de cassation has established a series of complex rules limiting
how ... references [to past judicial decisions] may be made."); Michel Troper & Christophe Grzegor-
czyk, Precedent in France, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 103, 115 (D. Neil
MacCormnick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997) ("There is no formal bindingness of previous judicial
decisions in France. One might even argue that there is an opposite rule: that it is forbidden to follow a
precedent only because it is a precedent.").
[Vol 26:269276
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to address counterarguments to their claims." The legal outcome is pre-
sented as the irrefutable conclusion to a sound syllogism. The absence of
judges' signatures seems like a logical extension of this formalist rhetoric:
unsigned opinions drive home the point that the judicial task is a deferen-
tial, mechanistic, anonymous one.
Then-Professor Elena Kagan once stated that "we are all realists now,"
and her adage is bome out-at least in the American context-by U.S.
scholars' caustic assessments of the Cour de Cassation's opinions. 34 These
scholars tend to regard French formalism as artificial and incoherent, if not
downright dishonest. Under this conception, unsigned opinions embody
the unfortunate impenetrability of the French system, concealing judges'
identities and reasoning. In The Oracles of the Law, John P. Dawson ar-
gues that the syllogistic style of French opinions-intended to restrict ju-
dicial power by requiring jurists to simply apply the law-actually results
in greater flexibility.3 ' By eschewing broad pronouncements and limiting
their reliance on precedent, judges avoid making commitments that will
bind them in future cases.36 John Henry Merryman makes a similar cri-
tique, arguing that the French legal system rests on a "fiction."37 Because
the Code cannot conceivably cover every situation that arises before the
courts, judges must engage in creative interpretations when they face a
case with unusual facts; however, they cannot acknowledge that they are
doing so, because their claims to legitimacy rest on the false belief that
they are mechanistically applying legislative provisions." Dawson evoca-
tively summarizes the criticisms by comparing the modem French judici-
ary to the Ancien R6gime's appellate courts, which possessed both legisla-
tive and adjudicative powers39 : "Behind the cascades of whereas clauses
one can still see stalking the ghostly magistrates of the Parlements, majes-
tic in their moldy red robes."40
These scholars are right to point out the formalist style of French deci-
sions, but they miss the point when they denounce Cour de Cassation
33. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 2e civ., Feb. 22, 1995, Bull. civ.
II, No. 61 (Fr.); see LASSER, supra note 14, at 33 ("[T]he Cour makes no effort to present countervail-
ing arguments or to address alternative points of view.").
34. Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 932 (1995).
35. DAWSON, supra note 18, at 383, 414-15.
36. Id; see also Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 649 (1995) ("[Jlust as
making a promise induces reasonable reliance, giving a reason creates a prima facie commitment on
the part of the reason giver to decide subsequent cases in accordance with that reason.").
37. MERRYMAN, supra note 25, at 151.
38. Id.
39. DAWSON, supra note 18, at 273-76, 305-14, 362-73.
40. Id. at 43 1; see also KENNEDY, supra note 25, at 94-95 ("Continentals don't do the kind of
internal critique . . . of judicial opinions that is the bread and butter of American critical legalism.");
id. at 107 ("[Y]our ordinary American lawyer is likely to find European solutions to classic legal prob-
lems blatantly formalist, in the sense of overestimating the power of deduction, and to find European
legal culture in general formalist in the same sense.").
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opinions for their straightforward, open-and-shut style. Within the French
governing structure, the Cour's formalism-and the unsigned opinions
that are associated with it-makes eminent sense as a strategy for main-
taining judicial legitimacy. Below, after outlining the structure of the
French court system, I analyze several specific means by which the Cour's
opinion-writing style enhances the judiciary's status in the eyes of the
French populace.
A. A Note on the French Judiciary
The French judicial system consists of two segments: civil courts and
administrative courts.4 1 The civil courts hear criminal prosecutions as well
as cases between private parties; the administrative courts hear cases in
which the state is a party. 42 The Cour de Cassation is the court of last re-
sort for the civil system,43 while the Conseil d'Etat acts as the highest
court for the administrative side." As Nicolas Kublicki has noted, the
French Cour de Cassation and the American Supreme Court should not be
thought of as cross-national counterparts: "In contrast to the Supreme
Court, the Cour de Cassation reviews neither administrative nor constitu-
tional controversies. ... Instead, the mission of the Cour de Cassation is to
maintain uniformity in the application of French law."' The Cour also dif-
fers from the Supreme Court in its size and workload: whereas the nine-
member American high court hears about seventy-five to ninety cases
each term,46 the 100-member Cour de Cassation takes on nearly 4,000 cas-
es each year.47
B. Legislative Supremacy
The Cour de Cassation operates within a political system founded on the
principle of legislative supremacy.4 To students of American politics, this
principle is a foreign one. In the United States, the language of "checks
and balances" and "separation of powers" pervades political conversation;
these terms reflect a commitment to a form of government in which each
41. Nicolas Marie Kublicki, An Overview of the French Legal System from an American Perspec-
tive, 12 B.U. INT'L. Li. 57, 60 (1994).
42. Id. at 60.
43. Id. at 65.
44. Id. at 70.
45. Id. at 65.
46. Although the Court used to hear many more cases per term, this figure has held in recent
years. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari
Process, 89 TEx. L. REV. 947, 965 (2007).
47. Kublicki, supra note 41, at 66.
48. Martin A. Rogoff, A Comparison of Constitutionalism in France and the United States, 49
ME. L. REV. 21, 23, 61-62 (1997); see also id. at 58-59 ("'[T]he Revolution extracted as one of the
great principles of the modem public law of France, the primacy and the supremacy of the legislative
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branch-possessing its own distinct brand of authority-balances the
powers exercised by the others. Only moments of acute constitutional cri-
sis call the branches' co-equal status into question. But in the French polit-
ical system, the legislature reigns supreme: it does not balance executive
or judicial authority but rather dominates it. As a result, when the Cour de
Cassation decides a case, it must rely on the legislature's Code; even the
Cour's own precedents are not a valid source of law when referenced as an
independent basis for a ruling.49 This helps to explain the syllogistic style
of many opinions: "The given legislative provision constitutes the major
premise; the facts constitute the minor premise; and the 'declaration of
what the statutory law commands regarding the controversy' forms the
conclusion."50 In this sense, the Cour's formalism seems like a sensible
response to the constraints imposed by the French governing structure. To
fulfill the French citizenry's expectations about legislative supremacy and
the role of the courts in a democratic society, the judiciary must adopt a
writing style that self-consciously emphasizes its subservience to the legis-
lative will. The price of legitimacy is deference to the Code.
C. Technocratic Training
Formalism also seems sensible as a strategy for emphasizing the legal
expertise on which French judges' legitimacy is founded. France has
adopted a "civil service model" for the selection and training of judges.
Individuals are chosen based on their performance on a series of exams,
and they advance through the judicial hierarchy based on evaluations by
their superiors.51 All aspiring jurists begin by enrolling in France's prestig-
ious post-graduate judicial college, Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature
(ENM). 52 The admissions examination is extremely competitive: typically,
only six to nine percent of students who take the test are admitted to
49. DAWSON, supra note 18, at 415; see supra note 32.
50. LASSER, supra note 14, at 34 (quoting SERVERIN EVELYNE, DE LA JURISPRUDENCE EN DROIT
PRIVE 70 (1985)).
51. John Bell, Principles and Methods ofJudicial Selection in France, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1757,
1759-60 (1988); Sande L. Buhai et al., The Role of Law Schools in Educating Judges to Increase Ac-
cess to Justice, 24 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 161, 180 (2011); Mary L. Volcansek,
Appointing Judges the European Way, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 363, 370-73 (2007); see also LASSER,
supra note 14, at 307-11 (explaining how the French system employs "professional normative man-
agement"--especially rigorous training programs for judges-to establish "judicial accountability and
control").
52. Jacqueline Lucienne Lafon, Judicial Career in France: Theory and Practice Under the Fifth
Republic, 75 JUDICATURE 97, 98 (1991) ("E.N.M. has acquired a solid reputation throughout the
years . . . ."). There are three avenues for admission to ENM: (1) those under the age of twenty-eight
must complete "at least two years of preparatory studies" and take an admissions exam; (2) those un-
der the age of forty who have worked for at least five years in a civil service position may take a dif-
ferent admissions test; and (3) individuals with significant legal experience-such as service on an
academic faculty or at least three years of legal work-are automatically granted admission. Marc T.
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ENM.53 Accepted students then undergo a rigorous twenty-seven-month
training program, in which they receive instruction on legal doctrines and
perform internships.' The students take a series of comprehensive exami-
nations, including a final placement test.55 Based on their performance, the
aspiring judges receive a ranking, which helps determine the court on
which they begin their judicial service.5 ' The Conseil Supdrieur de la
Magistrature, which consists of senior judges and administrative officials,
monitors judges once they are on the bench and makes promotion deci-
sions.57
This process of selecting judges relies on a particular view of the judi-
cial role-specifically, a technocratic one. 8 Successful judges embody
particular qualities, such as sharp analytical abilities, critical interpretive
skills, and legal expertise-skills that can be developed through training.
Moreover, instructors and senior judges can evaluate students based on the
degree to which they demonstrate these skills.59 To get a sense of the con-
trast between this technocratic view of the judge and a typical American
perspective on the judicial role, consider then-Senator Barack Obama's
2007 comments on his criteria for making judicial appointments: "We
need somebody who's got the heart, the empathy, to recognize what it's
like to be a young teenage mom. The empathy to understand what it's like
to be poor, or African-American, or gay, or disabled, or old."60 These
53. MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL TRANSFORMATIONS: THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION IN
THE COURTS OF EUROPE 45 (2009).
54. Id. at 134; Buhai et al., supra note 51, at 180.
55. LASSER, supra note 53, at 45; Buhai et al., supra note 51, at 180.
56. LASSER, supra note 53, at 45; Buhai et al., supra note 51, at 180 ("This [judicial placement
process] is basically a merit-based system: the better the score, the more impressive the court to which
a lawyer is assigned.").
57. Bell, supra note 51, at 1759.
58. Drawing on a definition developed by Daniel A. Crane, I here use "technocratic" to refer to
"the insulation of a governmental function from popular political pressures and its administration by
experts rather than generalists." Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159,
1162 (2008).
59. See RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 198 (2008) ("A career judiciary requires per-
formance criteria that can be used to make objective promotion decisions, and the accuracy of a literal
interpretation of a legislative text is easier to evaluate than the soundness of a pragmatic interpreta-
tion.").
60. Carrie Dann, Obama on Judges. Supreme Court, NBC NEWS (July 17, 2007, 7:21 PM),
http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2007/07/17/4439758-obama-on-judges-supreme-court?lite. Per-
haps characterizing this statement as "typical" overstates the point: it became the subject of much con-
troversy when President Obama made his first nomination to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, Beware of Empathy, FORBES (May 5, 2009, 12:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/04/supreme-court-justice-opinions-columnists-epstein.html ("It might
be smart politics for Obama to play to his natural constituencies, but there is, I think, no worse way to
go about the selection process. Empathy matters in running business[es], charities and churches. But
judges perform different functions."); John Paul Rollert, Reversed on Appeal: The Uncertain Future of
President Obama's "Empathy Standard", YALE L.J. ONLINE (Oct. 15, 2010),
http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/forum/reversed-on-appeal-the-uncertain-future-of-president-obamas-
qempathy-standardq ("To the Right, empathy was nothing less than a code word for judicial activism,
a dog whistle to the Democratic base that the President would choose judges who would put the coun-
sel of a bleeding heart above the demands of impartial justice."). However, the point is that the state of
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comments would be incomprehensible to French jurists, who are selected
on the basis of their scholastic achievements rather than their personal
characteristics or empathetic attitude. President Obama was articulating
the antithesis of the technocratic view of the judiciary, claiming that char-
acteristics beyond legal expertise or intellectual pedigree should influence
judicial appointments.
Therefore, one of the ways in which the French judiciary maintains le-
gitimacy is by emphasizing judges' legal expertise-their training, their
knowledge, and their consistency in decision-making. Once expertise be-
comes the salient metric for measuring jurists' ability-and once prestig-
ious educational institutions are established to instill such expertise-
judges have an instant measure of legitimacy: those who graduate from
ENM have passed through a rigorous training program and have proven
themselves as credible legal authorities. A formalist writing style fits well
with a technocratic conception of the judiciary. The judges' straightfor-
ward rhetoric emphasizes that they are simply applying their knowledge to
reach a foregone legal conclusion. In addition, if a different set of judges
had decided the case, they would have drawn on the same fount of
knowledge to reach the same ruling. The judges' identities are irrelevant,
which means that they do not need to sign their opinions.
D. Dialogic Engagement
Formalism plays a crucial role in ensuring that judges stay true to what
the French public regards as the traditional judicial role-employing ex-
pert legal knowledge to apply the legislative Code. The Cour de Cassa-
tion's syllogistic rhetoric also upholds the court's legitimacy by respond-
ing to another imperative-the need to engage the public in dialogue about
the law. This claim is a counterintuitive one. The traditional conception is
that the Cour's formalism, by obfuscating the rationales behind its deci-
sions, limits the public's ability to engage with judicial rulings. Far from
restricting criticism, however, the Cour's terseness leaves space for legal
academics and public commentators to contribute to the development of
the law.
The Recueil Dalloz and the Juris-Classeur Priodique are prominent
(but unofficial) French case reporters, and they contain notes authored by
prominent academics. These notes-many of which appear directly after
political discourse in the United States permitted President Obama to make these comments about em-
pathy; his statement was comprehensible to American citizens, many of whom recognize that judges'
personal characteristics influence their judicial decisions. In fact, in a 2010 poll, about two-thirds of
American respondents stated that the President should consider "empathy" in making judicial ap-
pointments, while only eight percent stated that empathy should play no role whatsoever in the judicial
selection process. James L. Gibson, Expecting Justice and Hoping for Empathy, PAC. STANDARD
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the cases on which they comment-consciously eschew the formalist style
of French judicial rhetoric.6 1 They discursively discuss the value judg-
ments that underlie decisions, methodically analyzing the rulings' implica-
tions for French jurisprudence. For example, an academic note authored
by Yves Chartier 62 followed the "vegetative state" case discussed earlier. 63
The note argues that the Cour's decision was based on the principle of
human dignity-the idea "that every person is and remains a human being,
however gravely injured (s)he may be."' Chartier also takes up significant
counterarguments to the Cour's ruling, which notably went unaddressed in
the opinion itself:
It is, however, true that if the rule of complete reparation of dam-
age imposes complete indemnification of all types of damage in-
curred, only such damage must be retained. This may lead to an
objection, because, precisely, the appellate court had ruled that the
victim was not able to "feel anything at all in the way of existential
concerns, be it pain, or the sentiment of diminution due to disfig-
urement, or the frustration of [life's] pleasures." This explains, fur-
thermore, how it has been very logically held in the academic liter-
ature that a victim in a vegetative state had to be denied certain
types of damages, not because (s)he was not "worthy" of them, but
because (s)he did not incur them. .65
Chartier addresses the objection by once again referring to the principle of
human dignity. Once the court has acknowledged that the victim is a "hu-
man being," the harm to her dignity must be compensated regardless of
her subjective experience of that harm.66 In this sense, the academic note
articulates the values behind the decision and addresses important objec-
tions, filling in the gaps that might otherwise plague the Cour's opinion.
For an American unversed in the style of French jurisprudence, the dis-
covery of academic notes placed next to cases is startling: imagine skim-
ming through the West Federal Reporter and finding numerous articles
filled with criticisms of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.6 ' The place-
ment of these academic notes in a case reporter confutes some of the con-
ventional wisdom advanced by comparative scholars. French academics
do not treat the Cour's conclusions as the inevitable outcome of applying
61. DAWSON, supra note 18, at 398; LASSER, supra note 14, at 40. Some of the notes are con-
tained in a separate section of the reporter; at the end of each case, the text refers readers to the section
containing any notes relevant to that case. Id.
62. For the original version of the note, see Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial
matters] 2e civ., Feb. 22, 1995, D. 1996, 69, 69-70, Yves Chartier (Fr.). For the translation used in the
text and in the appendix, see LASSER, supra note 14, at 40-42.
63. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 62.
65. See supra note 62.
66. See supra note 62.
67. See LASSER, supra note 14, at 341.
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law to facts, but instead hold the rulings up to detailed scrutiny. The
scholars' writings implicitly concede that the law is subject to varying in-
terpretations and that judges' interpretations might not always be the best
ones. Comparativists who emphasize the Cour de Cassation's formalism,
therefore, are simply looking in the wrong place. By focusing on the
Cour's vague opinions, comparative scholars miss the academic critiques
that sit directly beside those opinions in public reporters.
When French academics write detailed commentaries on judicial deci-
sions, they indicate that they are taking the Cour's jurisprudence seriously.
In this sense, the very existence of powerful, engaged criticism enhances
the judiciary's credibility. Moreover, criticism holds the Cour accountable,
subjecting judicial decisions to the plaudits or censure that they deserve.
When the judiciary withstands academic scrutiny-and especially when it
receives praise from the critics-it demonstrates that it is adequately ful-
filling its duties within the French governing structure. By engaging the
Cour in dialogue about the law, academic criticism enhances the judici-
ary's legitimacy.
E. The Paradoxical Nature ofJudicial Legitimacy
In the previous sections, I have outlined three specific mechanisms by
which the Cour de Cassation maintains legitimacy: judges defer to the su-
preme legislature, undergo technocratic training programs, and endure rig-
orous academic criticism. Drawing these three mechanisms together, the
Cour's legitimacy depends on its bureaucratic norms. Like a typical bu-
reaucracy or administrative agency,68 the Cour defers to its hierarchical
superiors (the French legislature) and relies on experts (trained judges). Its
opinions read more like the outcome of a notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedure than like the product of a normatively charged adjudicatory
process; the Cour leaves the investigation of policy implications to aca-
demic commentators. Within a judicial system that draws its legitimacy
from these sources, unsigned opinions are a sensible tool, cementing the
view that judges are anonymous bureaucrats administering the legisla-
ture's Code.
At first glance, the bureaucratic bases of French judicial legitimacy
might seem contradictory: legitimacy emerges from the perception that
judges are technocratic experts reaching the "correct" legal conclusions,
but the Cour's authority also rests on academic scrutiny that calls the cor-
rectness of those conclusions into question. The French judiciary recon-
ciles this seeming paradox by "bifurcating"6 9 judicial decision-making
68. See supra note 19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the definition of "bureaucracy."
69. 1 take the term "bifurcation" from LASSER, supra note 14, at 27. See generally id. at 27-61
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from academic criticism. Unlike the Supreme Court, the Cour de Cassa-
tion could not permit concurrences or dissents, because doing so would
allow some judges to reprove others-undermining the impression that
judges are interchangeable machines applying mathematical formulas.
Nonetheless, some form of criticism is important to hold the Cour ac-
countable and ensure the development of the law. As a result, the French
judiciary delegates the task of criticism to a less visible source than the
judges themselves: academics. The Cour uses its terse opinions to estab-
lish its legal bona fides, while scholarly notes entrench the legitimacy that
comes from dialogic engagement-without calling as much attention to
legal flaws as would a concurrence or dissent authored by another jurist.
In other words, bifurcation allows the Cour to have its cake and eat it
too-to draw on two distinct sources of legitimacy (technocratic and criti-
cal) that rest on the backs of two distinct institutions (the judiciary and the
academy).
II. THE AMERICAN CONTEXT
The Cour de Cassation has adopted a number of tactics to maintain its
legitimacy while negotiating the tensions underlying judicial work. These
tactics depend on the specific constraints and opportunities presented by
the French governing structure-for example, the need to defer to the leg-
islature and the ability to engage with legal academics. Facing similar
challenges but operating within a distinct political context, the United
States Supreme Court has deployed a different approach. Rather than bi-
furcating judicial decision-making from academic criticism, the Court in-
tegrates both elements in its opinions. These opinions include formalist
applications of the law, broader discussions of the values underlying deci-
sions, and detailed responses to counterarguments-many of which are
raised by the author's fellow Justices in separate concurrences or dissents.
Unsigned opinions, which mesh well with the Cour de Cassation's rheto-
ric, are less suitable in an American context that emphasizes the value
judgments on which judicial rulings are based. Because judges are not
merely bureaucrats but value articulators, their personal preferences-their
identities-matter. They acknowledge this point each time they place their
names atop a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion.
A. The Sources ofAmerican Judicial Authority
The Supreme Court draws its authority from different sources than the
French Cour de Cassation. For example, while American judges often hail
judicial modesty and deference to the legislature as virtues,70 these charac-
70. See, e.g., Roberts Confirmation Hearings, supra note I1, at 163 (statement of John G. Rob-
erts, Jr., Nominee for Chief Justice of the United States) ("I think [my opinions as a judge on the Dis-
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teristics do not confer legitimacy to the same extent as in the French sys-
tem. The concept of "legislative supremacy" holds less weight for an
American public that accepts judicial review and regards the three branch-
es of government as coequal partners. Perhaps the most famous sentence
in American constitutional law comes from Chief Justice Marshall's opin-
ion in Marbury v. Madison71 : "It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is." 72 This statement is directly
antithetical to the French view, in which the legislature has sole authority
to "say what the law is." 73 Similarly, the technocratic character of judges
does not provide the same sense of credibility in the American context as
it does in France. Beyond law school, jurists are not required to undergo
significant preparation for the work of judging; although some law schools
and the Federal Judicial Center74 offer training programs, these sessions
are typically optional and informal." While judges' law school educations
prepare them for their work, lawyers often follow different paths-
including stints in the public sector, private law practice, or legal academ-
ia-before attaining a judgeship. The road to the judiciary does not in-
clude the detailed signposts that French jurists must follow. 76
In the absence of formal training programs or strong presumptions of
legislative supremacy, the Supreme Court relies on its opinions to estab-
lish its authority. Simply reading a decision indicates the centrality of the
judicial opinion to the Court's work. Decisions frequently span many pag-
es, 77 separate concurrences and dissents abound 78 and the rationales be-
hind rulings are explicitly outlined. When an opinion is published in the
trict of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals] show a healthy regard for the prerogatives of the legisla-
tive branch that is appropriate."); Stuart Taylor Jr., In Praise of Judicial Modesty, THE ATLANTIC
(Mar. 21, 2006, 12:00 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/03 lin-praise-of-
judicial-modesty/304769/ ("How might we avoid the worst excesses of [both originalism and living
constitutionalism]? The best answer is judicial modesty, in the sense of great hesitation to second-
guess decisions by other branches of government.").
71. Markham, supra note 13, at 938.
72. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
73. LASSER, supra note 14, at 171-74 (explaining that judicial decisions do not have the status of
law in France).
74. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov (last visited Apr. 30, 2013) (describing "ori-
entation and continuing education and training" programs for federal judges).
75. Amy, supra note 52, at 130-31 (discussing the scant training options available for newly ap-
pointed judges); see also id. at 130 (advocating for an LL.M. degree program that would prepare judg-
es-in-training for the bench).
76. See infra Part III.A for a qualification of this point, relating to the relatively similar career
tracks of recent appointees to the Supreme Court.
77. Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of US. Supreme
Court Opinions, 45 Hous. L. REv. 621, 634 (2008) (noting that the average majority opinion from
1988 to 2008 clocked in at 4,250 words); Adam Liptak, Justices Are Long on Words But Short on
Guidance, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/l1/18/us/18rulings.html (not-
ing that the median length of Supreme Court opinions reached an all-time high in the Supreme Court's
October 2009 term).
78. John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court 1790-
1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 175 (1999) (noting that the ratio of separate opinions to majority opin-
ions began to increase in the early 1940s, hovering between 1.2 and 1.7 during the past fifty years).
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United States Reports or unofficial reporters, it appears sans academic
commentaries: the opinion speaks entirely for itself.7 9
Because the Court's opinions play such a crucial role in establishing le-
gitimacy, they must simultaneously fulfill multiple functions. First, they
need to demonstrate the Court's adherence to the rule of law.80 They must
provide strong legal justifications for the ruling, indicating that the Justic-
es are not imputing their personal views to the Constitution or to a stat-
ute.81 At the same time, opinions must incorporate mechanisms for hold-
ing the Justices accountable. Since academic commentaries are consigned
to law journals (instead of appearing in case reporters themselves), schol-
arly writings may not provide an accountability check to the same extent
as French academic notes. Instead, the Supreme Court internalizes criti-
cism. The Justices actively address possible counterarguments to their
claims, and the publication of separate concurrences and dissents forces
those who sign onto the majority opinion to defend themselves against at-
tacks launched by their peers.8 2 Finally, the Court's opinions typically
provide some indication of the values underlying the holding." This is an-
other function fulfilled by academic notes in the French system. In the
United States, however, the Justices take up the task themselves, incorpo-
rating a discussion of public values into their already hefty opinions. 84
B. The Dual Objectives ofAmerican Judicial Opinions: Missouri v.
McNeely
As in the French context, a representative opinion illustrates the point.
Consider Missouri v. McNeely," one of the Court's recent cases.86 In con-
trast to the Cour de Cassation's unanimity, the Justices issued four sepa-
rate opinions in McNeely-the opinion of the Court (part of which com-
manded a majority, part of which commanded only a plurality), a partial
concurrence, a partial concurrence/partial dissent, and a dissent. 87 The syl-
79. LASSER, supra note 14, at 341.
80. See Kevin M. Stack, The Practice ofDissent in the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 2235, 2235
(1996) ("The United States Supreme Court's connection to the ideal of the rule of law is often taken to
be the principal basis of the Court's political legitimacy.").
8 1. Id.
82. E.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010)
("My experience teaches that there is nothing better than an impressive dissent to lead the author of the
majority opinion to refine and clarify her initial circulation."); Antonin Scalia, Dissents, OAH
MAGAZINE OF HISTORY, Fall 1998, at 22 ("The most important internal effect of a system permitting
dissents and concurrences is to improve the majority opinion. ... [T]he first draft of a dissent often
causes the majority to refine its opinion, eliminating the more vulnerable assertions and narrowing the
announced legal rule.").
83. LASSER, supra note 14, at 338-39.
84. Id.
85. 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013).
86. Oral arguments occurred on January 9, 2013, and the opinion came down on April 17, 2013.
Id. at 1552.
87. Id. at 1556.
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labus lists the author of each opinion, as well as the names of the Justices
who signed onto it.88 Justice Sotomayor's opinion for the Court begins
with a detailed account of the facts. Although the case involved a simple
traffic stop," the decision devotes nearly two pages to describing exactly
what happened-longer than the entirety of most Cour de Cassation opin-
ions. 90 The majority also lays out the procedural history of the case in ex-
acting detail, discussing rulings by the trial court, the Missouri Court of
Appeals, and the Missouri Supreme Court.9 1
By the time the majority reaches its legal analysis, it has provided a
thorough factual background to contextualize its reasoning. The question
in the case was whether the Fourth Amendment permitted police officers
to perform a warrantless, nonconsensual blood test on a possible drunk
driver.92 The majority's answer commences with a clause that might ap-
pear at the beginning of a Cour de Cassation opinion ("Given art.
XXX. . ."): the Court quotes part of the Fourth Amendment.93 However,
the writing immediately deviates from the French model by referring to
the Supreme Court's precedents: "Our cases have held that a warrantless
search of the person is reasonable [under the Fourth Amendment] only if it
falls within a recognized exception."94 The subsequent paragraphs analyze
one such exception (the "exigent circumstances" rule), citing no less than
eighteen precedents that outline the contours of the exemption.95 Based on
these prior rulings, the Court rejects the State's argument for a per se rule,
concluding that a "totality of the circumstances" test must be applied to
determine when exigent circumstances exist.96 The next four pages of the
opinion respond directly to counterarguments raised by the State and the
Chief Justice's partial dissent.97
In some ways, the opinion adopts a formalistic tone that would not seem
out of place in a Cour de Cassation opinion. By beginning with the lan-
guage of the Fourth Amendment, the majority emphasizes that it is draw-
ing its analysis from the constitutional text rather than from the Justices'
own political preferences. The Court's discussion of precedents, which
occupies the bulk of the opinion, is precise and detailed; the question is
88. Id.
89. In the words of the Missouri Supreme Court, the facts presented "a routine DWI case." State
v. McNeely, 358 S.W.3d 65, 74 (2012).
90. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1556-58.
9 1. Id.
92. Id. at 1556.
93. Id. at 1558. The quoted portion of the Fourth Amendment reads, "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . ." Id.
94. Id
95. Id at 1558-60.
96. Id. at 1559-63.
97. Id. at 1563-67.
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whether nonconsensual blood tests during DWI stops are per se permissi-
ble under the exceptions outlined in previous decisions, and a canvas of
those decisions indicates that the answer is no.98 Yet at certain moments,
the Court gives the reader a glimpse of the value judgments underlying its
holding. In a sentence that sounds like it could come from Chartier's aca-
demic note, the majority states that nonconsensual blood tests constitute
"an invasion of bodily integrity [that] implicates an individual's 'most per-
sonal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy."' 99 The Court is signaling
that its reasoning-and some of its hesitance to impose a per se rule-
springs from its concerns about individual privacy. The majority is not
merely engaging in a formalistic application of the law but is explicitly ar-
ticulating the values-in this case, personal autonomy and bodily integri-
ty-that underlie its decision.
The values that pervade the Court's holding are also evident in the ma-
jority's response to the State's counterarguments. Missouri's attorneys ar-
gued that the compelling need to prevent automobile accidents justified a
per se rule allowing police to perform warrantless, nonconsensual blood
tests on suspected drunk drivers. In this sense, the case embodied a classic
conflict between the State's need to implement its laws and the individu-
al's right to privacy. oo The Court confronted the conflict head-on:
We have never retreated . . . from our recognition that any com-
pelled intrusion into the human body implicates significant, consti-
tutionally protected privacy interests. . . . [T]he general importance
of the government's interest in [eradicating drunk driving] does
not justify departing from the warrant requirement without show-
ing exigent circumstances that make securing a warrant impracti-
cal in a particular case.' 0'
These sentences would have no place in a Cour de Cassation opinion.
They explicitly articulate the value judgments-the balance between per-
sonal privacy and law enforcement-that underlie the majority's analysis.
The Court's writing indicates that it is no longer simply "applying" the
Fourth Amendment or the Court's precedents. It is expressing a consid-
ered judgment that (in this context) individuals' privacy interests outweigh
the government's need to prevent drunk driving.'02 The other Justices di-
98. Of course, the explicit reliance on precedents distinguishes the decision from a Courde Cassa-
tion opinion; however, the formalistic interpretation and application of those precedents mirrors the
Cour's analysis of the French Code.
99. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1558 (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985)).
100. Id. at 1565-66.
101. Id. at 1565.
102. The value judgments implicit in the Court's analysis are also evident in the majority's dis-
cussion of the trade-offs between per se rules and "totality of the circumstances" tests. Id. at 1564.
While choosing between these two tests may depend on empirical judgments about which will be more
effective in enforcing the Fourth Amendment's requirements, it also depends on a value judgment
about the best balance between hard-line rules and privacy interests. The majority makes this value
analysis explicit: "While the desire for a bright-line rule is understandable, the Fourth Amendment will
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rectly engage with the majority's value weighing. For example, Chief Jus-
tice Roberts's partial concurrence/partial dissent'03 and Justice Thomas's
dissent'0" emphasize the importance of law enforcement needs without ev-
er using the word "privacy." Those who did not join the Court's opinion
evidently had different views on the appropriate balance. Their disagree-
ments with the majority emerge not only from divergent interpretations of
precedent, but also from incompatible perspectives on the weight that
should be accorded to bodily integrity in the face of police imperatives.
C. The Pseudo-Formality of the Supreme Court Opinion
Several other scholars have confirmed what the frequent reader of Su-
preme Court decisions has probably observed: like McNeely, many of the
Court's opinions represent a dissonant meld of formalist and value-centric
reasoning.os For example, Mitchel de S.-O.-l'E. Lasser has examined the
Supreme Court's use of multi-pronged tests in constitutional cases. 06 The-
se tests outline a set of elements ("prongs") that the Justices consider when
applying a given constitutional provision. 07 At first glance, multi-pronged
tests appear to embody formalist ideals: they outline clear factors that can
be used to predictably apply the law. Moreover, the Justices often empha-
size the connection between the test and the constitutional provision that
they are interpreting, implying that the prongs emerge directly from the
Constitution's language.os According to Lasser, however, multi-pronged
tests often take on a life of their own, displacing the text from which they
are drawn.109 In future cases, the Justices tend to refer back to the test it-
self rather than to the relevant constitutional provision.110 Because judi-
cially crafted tests can be narrowed or expanded more easily than can the
canonical words of the Constitution, multi-pronged standards give the Jus-
tices leeway to develop the law in desired directions."' The Court often
uses-even manipulates-its own multi-pronged tests to elevate favored
not tolerate adoption of an overly broad categorical approach that would dilute the warrant require-
ment in a context where significant privacy interests are at stake." Id. Once again, the need to protect
privacy outweighs the State's interest in crafting a broad rule that will categorically allow law en-
forcement officers to conduct warrantless, nonconsensual blood tests.
103. Id. at 1571 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Evidence [i.e., alcohol
in the bloodstream] is literally disappearing by the minute.. . . And that evidence is important. A seri-
ous and deadly crime is at issue.").
104. Id. at 1577 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires officers to
allow evidence essential to enforcement of drunk-driving laws to be destroyed while they wait for a
warrant to issue.").
105. LASSER, supra note 14, at 101-02.
106. Mitchel de S.-O.-l'E. Lasser, "Lit. Theory" Put to the Test: A Comparative Literary Analysis
ofAmerican Judicial Tests and French Judicial Discourse, Ill HARV. L. REv. 689 (1998).
107. Id. at 702.
108. Id. at 715-16.
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values and subordinate others."12
In a particularly vivid example, Lasser analyzes a series of cases inter-
preting the Sixth Amendment's Counsel Clause." 3 The Clause reads, "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .. to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense."l' 4 In a 1984 opinion, Justice
O'Connor crafted a two-pronged test to explain the Clause's application in
cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel:
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so de-
fective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has
two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Se-
cond, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense." 5
Justice O'Connor's formalist analysis directly references the Sixth
Amendment; she claims that the term "counsel" means effective counsel,
although this is not entirely clear from a reading of the provision at is-
sue." 6 In future cases, the Court referred directly to Justice O'Connor's
test rather than to the Counsel Clause itself.'"7 Her analysis displaced the
constitutional text, allowing the Supreme Court to entrench a value-
defendants' entitlements to effective counsel-that was protected in the
Court's precedents but not necessarily in the Sixth Amendment."' In other
words, the Justices used the tools of formalism to make-and perhaps to
conceal that they were making-a value judgment about the requirements
of a fair trial." 9
Lasser demonstrates the convergence of the Court's formalistic and val-
ue articulation functions in several other lines of precedents, including
Dormant Commerce Clause decisions' 20 and cases involving "plain mean-
ing" debates on statutory interpretation.121 These findings confirm what a
112. Id; see also Nagel, supra note 23, at 203 (discussing the "formulaic style" of opinion-
writing, which emphasizes "formalized doctrine expressed in elaborately layered sets of 'tests' or
'prongs' or 'requirements' or standards' or 'hurdles': "Rather than binding, the formulaic style frees
the Court, like some lumbering bully, to disrupt social norms and practices at its pleasure.").
113. Lasser, supra note 106, at 713-18.
114. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
115. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
116. Lasser, supra note 106, at 717.
117. In Darden v. Wainwright, for instance, Justice Powell wrote, "Petitioner contends that he
was denied effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of the trial. That claim must be
evaluated against the two-part test announced in Strickland v. Washington. . . ." Darden v. Wain-
wright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 (1986). Justice Powell leapfrogs the Sixth Amendment itself, jumping
straight to the judicially created test. Lasser, supra note 106, at 719-20.
118. Lasser, supra note 106, at 717-18, 719-20, 739.
119. Id.at739.
120. Id. at 704-10.
121. LASSER, supra note 14, at 88-101. Robert F. Nagel has reached similar conclusions. He ar-
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close analysis of Justice Sotomayor's opinion in McNeely suggested: the
Court's opinions strive to be "all things to all people."l2 2 The Justices in-
tegrate formalist analysis with value articulation, emphasizing that they
are staying within their judicial role even as they subtly chisel at the
boundaries of that role.
Lasser's study comes with several caveats and subtleties. To suggest
that the Supreme Court's opinions integrate formalism and value articula-
tion is not to suggest that all of its opinions do so to an equal degree. Lass-
er's analysis seems like it might have the most to say about constitutional
adjudication-cases in which the Court is interpreting a relatively vague
provision from the foundational text and must resort to value judgments to
reach its conclusions. As Judge Posner has noted, "a constitution tends to
deal with fundamental issues," and "fundamental issues in the constitu-
tional context are political issues: they are issues about political govern-
ance, political values, political rights, and political power."l 2 3 In contrast,
when faced with statutory questions, the Court may be better equipped to
reach decisions that eschew value judgments-for example, by deferring
to congressional intent or invoking interpretive canons.124 Yet even in
statutory cases, the Court must sometimes rely on contestable value judg-
ments to interpret unclear provisions. As William N. Eskridge, Jr., has
demonstrated, many interpretive canons "demand normative analysis and,
therefore, discretionary choices on the part of judges."l25 For example,
when a judge invokes the "purpose canon"-to use Eskridge's term-she
is making a normative judgment about the role that Congress's purpose
should play in statutory construction.126 In this sense, there are reasons to
suspect that formalism and value articulation might interact differently in
constitutional and statutory cases; nonetheless, there are also reasons to
gues that the Court's use of "formulaic" analytical techniques, such as multi-pronged tests, seems to
impose "impersonal constraint[s]" on the Justices-when in fact these techniques "free[] the Court ...
to disrupt social norms and practices at its pleasure." Nagel, supra note 23, at 197-203; cf Richard A.
Posner, Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1421, 1437-43 (1995) (ar-
guing that the use of a formalistic test in United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1992), "ob-
scure[d]" the fundamental policy issue by failing to explicitly address the purpose of the statute in
question).
122. LASSER, supra note 14, at 341.
123. Posner, supra note 21, at 39-40 (also noting that "constitutional provisions tend to be both
old and vague-old because amendments are infrequent (in part because amending is so difficult) and
vague because when amending is difficult a precisely worded constitutional provision tends to become
an embarrassment because it will not easily bend to changed circumstances, and circumstances change
more over a long interval than over a short one").
124. James F. Spriggs 11 & Thomas G. Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of U.S. Supreme
Court Precedent, 63 J. POL. 1091, 1103 (2001) (providing data to suggest that courts may be more
hesitant to overrule precedents in statutory than in constitutional cases). Judge Posner took this study
to indicate that "the Court behaves in a more conventionally lawlike manner in statutory, as distinct
from constitutional, cases-for example, it is much more likely to follow precedent in statutory cases."
Posner, supra note 21, at 49 n.52.
125. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
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believe that formalism and value articulation will play a role in both sets
of cases, influencing the Court's decisions regardless of the underlying
text that it is interpreting.
Viewed in this light, the signed opinion fits well with the American
style of jurisprudence. The Supreme Court opinion must not only demon-
strate judges' adherence to legal doctrines, but must also indicate the pub-
lic policy rationales that Justify the decision. Because values matter in the-
se opinions, identities matter, too. Understanding the ideals embraced by a
particular judge requires knowing the perspective from which the judge is
coming; it requires knowing who that judge is. By revealing the Justice's
identity, the signed opinion becomes the American answer to the French
academic note-indicating that the Supreme Court assigns to judges, ra-
ther than legal scholars, the task of articulating the values that underlie ju-
dicial reasoning.1
III. THE PROBLEM WITH SIGNED OPINIONS
The previous section suggested that the Supreme Court Justices' work
includes bureaucratic, formalist elements, but it also includes a task that
would never be assigned to the typical bureaucrat-namely, the articula-
tion of fundamental societal values. This work is not guided by the
straightforward rules or hierarchical regulations that define technocratic
duties; it is not an administrative task but an adjudicative one.
A. A Contingent Critique of the Signed Opinion
Over the past several years, however, encroaching bureaucratization at
the Supreme Court has begun to belie some of the justifications for the
signed opinion. As Richard J. Lazarus notes, the last two decades have
seen the rise of a Supreme Court bar-an elite group of lawyers who often
argue cases before the Justices.128 The Solicitor General's frequent in-
volvement in the Court's cases only compounds the trend. Since 1986, the
SG's Office has participated in seventy-five percent of cases that reach the
merits stage, either as a party or as an amicus.129 As a result of these
changes (coupled with the Court's decreasing caseload 3 o), the Justices
127. See Scalia, supra note 82, at 21 ("In our system, it is not left to the academicians to stimulate
and conduct discussion concerning the validity of the Court's latest ruling. The Court itself is not just
the central organ of legal judgment; it is center stage for significant legal debate. In our law schools, it
is not necessary to assign students the writings of prominent academics so that they may recognize and
reflect upon the principal controversies of legal method or of constitutional law. Those controversies
appear in the opposing opinions of the Supreme Court itself. . . .").
128. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming
the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, I488-89 (2008).
129. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Solicitor General's Changing Role in
Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2010).
130. Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court's Shrinking Docket, 53
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1228-29 (2012) ("In the 1960s, the number [of cases on the docket] rose
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hear fewer voices during oral arguments, and the voices they do hear tend
to come from similar backgrounds-service in similar government offices,
educational credentials from similar schools, work in similar law firms.'
Relatedly, the Justices themselves seem to come from comparable back-
grounds. All nine of the current Justices attended either Harvard or Yale
Law School (as well as private undergraduate colleges),132 three served as
Supreme Court law clerks, 33 three worked in the Solicitor General's Of-
fice,134 eight served as federal appeals court judges,'35 and eight hail from
one of three states (New York, New Jersey, or California).136
In these ways, the Justices are beginning to resemble their French coun-
terparts.137 Like a French jurist graduating from ENM, the Justices have
attended the same prestigious schools and have moved through the same
judicial hierarchy. In addition, the relatively defined career paths of the
current Justices-coupled with the fact that they are reading briefs from
lawyers with similar backgrounds-creates the impression that a select
group of skilled jurists has a monopoly on legal knowledge. This trend re-
inforces the bureaucratic ideal that judges should distinguish themselves
by their legal expertise rather than by the values that they express through
their jurisprudence. Increasing bureaucratization brings the Justices closer
to about 137 per Term, and by the middle of the 1980s, the Court heard slightly more cases. Starting in
the late 1980s and moving forward into the 1990s, however, that number dropped precipitously. By
the 2000 Term, the Court heard only 87 cases.").
131. Lazarus, supra note 128, at 1492-502 (explaining how members of the Supreme Court bar
cultivated expertise in the Solicitor General's Office and elite law firms like Sidley Austin or Jones
Day). Heightened levels of amicus participation might mitigate the trend toward an increasingly con-
centrated Supreme Court bar; the submission of amicus briefs provides an opportunity for non-parties
to ensure that the Justices hear their perspectives. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The
Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 751-56 (2000)
("The Court received some 4907 amicus briefs in the last decade [of the study] (1986-1995), as op-
posed to 531 briefs in the first decade (1946-1955)--an increase of more than 800%."). Nonetheless,
studies have been inconclusive as to whether the increased levels of amicus participation influence the
Court's rulings. See, e.g., Padideh Ala'i, Judicial Lobbying at the WTO: The Debate over the Use of
Amicus Curiae Briefs and the U.S. Experience, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 62, 93 (2000) ("The practical
result of an open door policy [toward amicus submissions] has been that many amicus curiae submis-
sions are ignored and have little impact on the Supreme Court's decision making."). But see Kearney
and Merrill, supra, at 819 ("We do believe ... that our study provides evidence that amicus briefs that
speak to the requirements ofthe law exert some influence on the outcomes reached by the Court.").
132. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES [hereinafter Biographies of Current Justices], http://www.supremecourt.gov/about
fbiographies.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2013). The three most recently appointed Justices-Alito, So-
tomayor, and Kagan-all received their undergraduate degrees from Princeton. Id.
133. Justice Breyer clerked for Justice Goldberg during the 1964 term; Chief Justice Roberts
clerked for then-Justice Rehnquist during the 1980 term; and Justice Kagan clerked for Justice Mar-
shall during the 1987 term. Id.
134. The three are Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and Justice Kagan. Id.
135. The exception is Justice Kagan. Id. See Alleman & Mazzone, supra note 19, at 1358-62 (ex-
plaining that a judicial background appears increasingly important for appointment to the Supreme
Court); see also Benjamin H. Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Justice Pre-Appointment
Experience, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1137, 1148-71 (2012) (detailing the backgrounds of Justices on the Rob-
erts Court).
136. Justice Thomas was born in Georgia. Biographies of Current Justices, supra note 132.
137. Markham, supra note 13, at 941-42.
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to the model of the Cour de Cassation and thus undermines the case for
signed opinions. To the extent that the Justices are distinguished more by
their legal knowledge and career achievements than by their ability to ar-
ticulate fundamental values, their identities may not matter-and their
names may not need to appear atop their opinions. 8
Of course, this is not to suggest that the Court has completely morphed
into a bureaucracy, eschewing all semblance of its former self. The Justic-
es' opinions-as evidenced by McNeely-still include detailed discussions
of public values; some commentators even point to the contentiousness of
Supreme Court confirmation hearings as evidence that judicial appoint-
ments are politically charged decisions-rather than bureaucratic eleva-
tions or civil-service-style promotions.' 39 But the fact remains that the Su-
preme Court Justices-and the lawyers who argue in front of them-have
become an increasingly similar group, potentially calling into question the
justifications for the signed opinion.14 0
B. Comprehensiveness as Judicial Vice
The previous section gives rise to a contingent critique of the signed
opinion-one that depends on the degree to which the Court has bureau-
cratized, edging ever closer to the French model. However, signed opin-
ions also raise deeper concerns about American public discourse. These
worries depend less on other elements of the judicial system than on the
incentives that naturally arise when judges' names are associated with
their opinions.
As Fiss noted, the signed opinion signifies that the Justices have en-
gaged with their cases, and it provides a mechanism for holding them ac-
countable if they fail to do so.14' This accountability emerges from both
internal and external sources: from the personal pride that asserts itself
when one's name is attached to one's work, and from the knowledge that
the opinion's readers will know its author-and therefore know where to
direct any praise or criticism. Accountability, in turn, promotes legitimacy,
ensuring that the Justices do not exceed the bounds of judicial prerogative
and remain faithful to their obligations in a democratic polity.
138. None of this is to comment on the increasing bureaucratization at the Court as a normative
matter. These recent trends-relating to the backgrounds of the Justices, the development of the Su-
preme Court bar, and the participation of the Solicitor General's Office-may represent positive
movements that promote the development of a more professionalized, expert, elite class of lawyers.
The point is simply to illustrate the inconsistencies between these trends and some of the justifications
for the signed opinion.
139. See, e.g., Edward C. Dawson, Kagan Confirmation Contentiousness Continues Partisan
Trend, HOUSTON LAWYER, Sept.-Oct. 2010 ("[Elven more contentious [confirmation] battles are like-
ly yet to come, particularly when there is a nomination that could seriously shift the political center of
the Court.").
140. Barton, supra note 135, at 1187 ("It is empirically demonstrable that the current Supreme
Court Justices have had different collective experiences than past Supreme Court Justices.").
141. Fiss, supra note 12, at 1443.
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But accountability also has its downsides, and scholars have recently
begun to highlight some of these latent disadvantages. For example, Craig
S. Lerner and Nelson Lund argue that the signed opinion-the same tool
that promotes accountability-encourages the American public to view the
Justices as individuals rather than as members of a collective judicial
body, 142 while James Markham has suggested that signed opinions en-
courage the Justices to focus excessively on developing their personal ju-
risprudence.143 While these commentators have pointed to the downsides
of the Court's opinion-writing practices, there is another, perhaps more
damning, disadvantage to the accountability that springs from signed opin-
ions. Individual authorship brings attention-and sometimes praise-to
the Justices, but it also raises the possibility of backlash. When a Justice
writes a majority holding, she is forever tied to the decision; it is not un-
common to refer to "Justice X's opinion," even when she was speaking for
a unanimous Court.'" The author of the majority opinion often garners
praise for a well-received ruling, but she also becomes a target for the
holding's detractors-the name mentioned in venomous op-eds and in-
scribed on protestor's banners. The writer's best defense against this infa-
my is to craft an unassailable opinion. She must muster as many relevant
arguments as possible, dismiss every conceivable objection, discuss even
the most remotely applicable precedents, and then-the cherry on top-
articulate the foundational values that underlie the decision. The Justices'
integration of formalism and value articulation represents an adaptive re-
sponse to this imperative. They must defend themselves on all fronts-
from formalists and realists, liberals and conservatives-and so they write
opinions that attempt to be all things to all people. In other words, they
strive to be comprehensive.
At first glance, comprehensiveness might seem to be a virtue of the Su-
preme Court opinion. Because the Justices are not elected, they must justi-
fy their authority; detailed explanations of their reasoning constitute a
means of doing so. Moreover, thorough opinions give the American peo-
ple a foothold, ensuring that they can engage with the Court's arguments
and contribute to democratic debates about the shape of the law. But there
are dangers in the type of comprehensiveness practiced by the Supreme
142. Lerner & Lund, supra note 13, at 1281.
143. Markham, supra note 13, at 945-47.
144. Justice Blackmun learned this lesson better than perhaps any other Justice in the twentieth
century, when he became inextricably associated with the cause of abortion rights after authoring the
Court's majority opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Despite speaking for a seven-to-two
majority, Blackmun quickly came to be regarded as "the creator of abortion rights in America": "The
world attached [Roe] to Blackmun in a manner that few Supreme Court decisions are ever linked to
their authors. The popular attribution of Roe to Blackmun alone was a distortion of the Court's reality
that baffled him at first, and he resisted the notion that he was Roe's only creator." LINDA
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Court. First, the comprehensive opinion's discordant blend of formalism
and value articulation conceals the true ethical debates that underlie the
Court's decisions. In addition, the comprehensive opinion promotes the
internalization of democratic debate, encouraging the Justices to address
as many arguments and objections as possible-and potentially crowding
out other participants from this debate.145 Whereas the Cour de Cassation
makes space for academics to contribute to the development of the law,
Supreme Court decisions leave no room for argument: the issue has been
resolved, the opponents crushed, the battlefield barren.
None of this is to suggest that academics have abdicated their role in the
development of the American legal system. In contrast, the Court's com-
prehensive rhetoric has not dissuaded academics from attempting to con-
tribute to significant legal debates, and law journal volumes are filled with
those contributions. In fact, some scholars have famously attempted to
"rewrite" crucial judicial opinions, explaining how they would have au-
thored the opinion if they had been on the Court. 146 My point relates not to
the messages that academics are conveying to judges through their schol-
arly writings-but rather the message that judges are conveying to aca-
demics through their opinions. The Court's comprehensive style implies
that the Justices themselves have done all the work; although there may, in
fact, be additional work to do-and although scholars often prove that this
is the case by offering significant assessments of legal developments-the
Court's opinions do not promote that kind of dialogue. They do not indi-
cate an openness to critique from the outside, and they do not necessarily
reflect a willingness to alter judicial doctrines in response to academic
writing. 147
The first difficulty posed by comprehensive opinions is that they over-
lay ethical debates with a veneer of objectivity-in other words, they dis-
cordantly meld the Justices' dual roles as formalist judges and value artic-
ulators. The Justices cannot explicitly reveal that their decisions reflect
their value commitments, and the formalistic tools that characterize many
opinions-balancing tests, multi-pronged inquiries, "plain meaning" anal-
yses-may conceal the fundamental debates that underlie the Court's de-
cisions. These tools create the impression that the majority's reasoning is
"right"; the Justices' rationales do not simply express their value judg-
ments, but rather reflect the results of an impartial, formalist analysis. The
145. See LASSER, supra note 14, at 341; Nagel, supra note 23, at 184.
146. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN ET AL., WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE
SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION
(Jack M. Balkin ed., 2002); JACK M. BALKIN ET AL., WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE
NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION (Jack M.
Balkin ed., 2007).
147. Cf Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant,
N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/19/us/19bar.htmi (noting that federal
courts are citing fewer and fewer law review Articles in their decisions).
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Court's decision in McNeely illustrates the point. The majority not only
discussed the importance of weighing privacy interests against law en-
forcement concerns, but also announced that the Court's precedents re-
quired a particular balance-which, in this case, came out on the side of
privacy. This tendency defines the Court's balancing tests more generally:
the Justices weigh values and then announce that the Constitution or the
Court's precedents mandate a certain outcome.14 8 The use of seemingly
technical tactics-balancing, after all, sounds like a quintessentially scien-
tific task' 49-creates the impression that the decision resulted from a neu-
tral assessment of the case. In fact, however, the debate between conflict-
ing values-between privacy and law enforcement-relates less to the
objective "weight" that these values carry than to competing visions about
"the sort of society we are to be"5 0 : does our conception of society pro-
mote warrantless blood tests that secure essential law enforcement objec-
tives, or do we seek to protect individuals' bodily integrity from noncon-
sensual invasions? The majority and the dissenters were not only
balancing factors differently; they were outlining fundamentally different
visions of how American society should function.
The problem with signed opinions-with comprehensive opinions-is
that they elide this point. In McNeely, neither the majority's nor the minor-
ity's constitutional vision is inherently correct; if I assign a certain weight
to the value of "privacy," no one can tell me that this weight is wrong (alt-
hough they can, of course, advance arguments attempting to convince me
to change my view). Yet this is exactly what the opinion-writers in
McNeely attempted to do. In the penultimate section of its decision, the
majority rejected the State's argument that the "privacy interest implicated
by blood draws of drunk-driving suspects is relatively minimal.""' The
Court responds, "[T]he fact that people are 'accorded less privacy in . . .
automobiles because of th[e] compelling governmental need for regula-
148. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age ofBalancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,
992-95 (1987) ("Scientifically styled opinions, written to answer charges of subjectivity, make us
spectators as the Court places the various interests on the scales. The weighing mechanism remains a
mystery, and the result is simply read off the machine. Scientific balancing decisions are neither opin-
ions nor arguments that can engage us; they are demonstrations."). For other critiques of the Court's
use of balancing tests, see, for example, Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial
Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 56-59 (1987) (suggesting that the
Court's use of balancing tests amounts to a usurpation of legislative prerogatives by making the Justic-
es the arbiters of democratic arguments); Lawrence H. Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice
or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 606-14 (1985) (criticizing the use of utilitarian cost-
benefit analyses in judicial opinions, since they elide essential questions about American society by
implying that a simple weighing of values can resolve constitutional disputes). But see Frank N. Cof-
fin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales ofJustice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 16, 40-41 (1988) (arguing
that, while balancing tests are flawed, they often present the best doctrinal option among imperfect
alternatives).
149. See Aleinikoff, supra note 148, at 992-95.
150. Tribe, supra note 148, at 614 (emphasis omitted).
151. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1564.
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tion,' ... does not diminish a motorist's privacy interest in preventing an
agent of the government from piercing his skin." 5 2 The majority cannot
fully respond to Missouri's argument, because the only answer is that the
Court weighs privacy and security interests differently than does the State.
Yet instead of leaving the objection alone-instead of simply outlining its
constitutional perspective and admitting that other perspectives might be
equally tenable-the Court succumbs to its desire to respond to every
claim advanced by the litigants' attorneys. Rather than allow competing
visions to coexist, the Court rejects all alternatives-claiming that the
State's arguments not only express different value commitments than
those heralded by the Court, but also reflect inaccurate interpretations of
the Constitution.
Viewed in this light, comprehensiveness becomes judicial vice rather
than virtue, because it delegitimizes those who attempt to contribute to na-
tional debates-telling them that their views do not belong in our public
discourse and, in certain cases, that their views are contrary to the Consti-
tution. The signed opinion is not the only cause of these problems, but it
undoubtedly facilitates judges' desire to be comprehensive. Judges cannot
afford to be modest when their reputations are at stake. They cannot afford
to acknowledge that their opponent has a point when doing so will expose
them to personal attack. They cannot afford to admit what every judge
knows-that he or she might be wrong-when everyone else, in their own
individually authored opinions, makes a claim to irrefutable rightness. The
signed opinion, justified as a tool for promoting accountability, becomes a
means of eschewing humility.
In this conception, the Cour de Cassation becomes an unlikely paragon
for promoting democratic discourse. At first glance, the French judges'
vagueness appears to be superficial and dishonest, a technique for cover-
ing up the political ideals that truly justify the ruling. But if the Cour is not
ignoring these ideals-if it is instead opening up space for academics to
expound on them-then nothing is going unsaid: there are simply more
people speaking. Ideally, the Cour and the academy will exchange ideas,
building on each other's observations and dynamically contributing to the
development of the law. Because the Cour's opinions do not read like au-
thoritative dismissals of opponents' views, people with diverse ideological
commitments can read their own values into the holding.' Instead of ex-
152. Id. at 1565.
153. Cf Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Ac-
quaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 804 (2010) (suggesting that certain forms of legisla-
tive or judicial "obfuscation," by enabling individuals with varying cultural commitments to read those
commitments into the law, promote classically liberal objectives; "By striving to formulate laws in a
manner that admits of a variety of potential-even potentially contradictory-cultural justifications,
officials can furnish persons of diverse persuasions with the resources necessary to see affirmation of
their identities no matter what position the law takes.").
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cluding groups, the Cour encourages those with conflicting perspectives to
uncover unnoticed overlaps-i.e., consensus.154 The French opinion,
which seemed so empty, was simply waiting to be filled-not by judges
imposing their own values, but by citizens engaging in democratic self-
governance and debate.'
The comprehensiveness of the signed opinion, in contrast, cuts off dem-
ocratic dialogue before it begins. In an ironic reversal of the criticism
launched at French judges, the comprehensive opinion promotes the use of
seemingly impartial tools that conceal the value judgments underlying
judges' decisions.156 In doing so, these opinions cover value commitments
with a cloak of formalism and potentially prevent citizens from engaging
with judicial rulings.
CONCLUSION
Over the past decade, several theorists have urged the Supreme Court to
abandon signed opinions.' This Note has attempted to build on their ar-
guments by looking more comprehensively at the justifications for signed
opinions and considering how they fit within the broader story of Ameri-
can jurisprudence. In doing so, I arrive at a critique of signed opinions that
fundamentally differs from those advanced previously. I have focused on
the mismatch between the non-bureaucratic justifications for signed opin-
ions and the realities of increasing bureaucratization at the Court. This
gave rise to a deeper worry: the comprehensiveness of judicial opinions,
promoted by the individual accountability that arises when Justices' names
are attached to their decisions, may undermine the productive dialogue be-
tween courts and academics that characterizes French judicial discourse.
In reaching this conclusion, the Note also attempted to complicate the
standard understanding of French jurisprudence. American theorists tend
to draw a distinction between the French Cour de Cassation, which sees
itself as mechanistically applying the law, and the American Supreme
Court, which more forthrightly acknowledges its function as a value artic-
ulator. However, the truer distinction might be between a French Cour that
bifurcates formalism from value judgments and an American Court that
integrates them in its opinions. Both courts are attempting to navigate the
tension articulated by Justice Scalia-the tension between "finding" law
(staying true to the judicial role) and "making" law (acknowledging the
value judgments that underlie some decisions). The Cour de Cassation and
154. Id
155. Id.
156. See Nagel, supra note 23, at 177-203 (explaining that the Court's "formulaic" style, by inte-
grating formalist and legal realist reasoning, creates an impression of authoritativeness that may con-
ceal the Court's legal innovations).
157. See supra notes 143-44 & accompanying text.
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the Supreme Court have responded to this tension in distinct ways, and
their responses demonstrate characteristic features of French and Ameri-
can jurisprudence.
Given this analysis, the question arises: should the Supreme Court con-
tinue to issue signed opinions? I may disappoint the expectant reader by
stating that I am agnostic on this point-not because I believe that the
problems with signed opinions are trivial, but because it is unclear whether
the alternatives to this opinion style are superior. Certainly, the French
system of anonymous opinions comes with its own set of tradeoffs, and
signed opinions make sense as a pragmatic acknowledgment that judges'
identities matter.' But this Note has given us reason to urge judges to
write as if they were issuing unsigned opinions-to seek an opinion-
writing style that emulates the best elements of the French practice, leav-
ing space for democratic debate and engagement. By opening up room for
counterarguments and acknowledging that different "balances" of values
can fit within American debate, less comprehensive opinions might pro-
mote the rigorous academic exchanges that characterize French legal dis-
course.
This Note began with a statement from Justice Scalia, who argued that
judges should adhere to a jurisprudence of "as though"-always acting as
if they were finding law even when they are, in fact, making it. Justice
Scalia's style of jurisprudence risks creating a Court that is less transpar-
ent in acknowledging the value judgments that justify its opinions. None-
theless, the Justice has a point for those who believe that judges should not
have the final word in defining societal values. By leaving much unsaid-
by obfuscating rationales, embracing ambiguity, sacrificing comprehen-
siveness-the Supreme Court might better serve its role as a single player
in the expansive public conversation that comprises American legal dis-
course.
158. Mark Tushnet argues that the Court's rhetorical flourishes and "memorable phrases" serve
an important educative role. These phrases became associated with particular decisions and provide
the public with a way of understanding those decisions. Mark Tushnet, Style and the Supreme Court's
Educational Role in Government, II CONST. COMMENT. 215, 223 (1994). By ensuring that the Justic-
es receive credit for the opinions they author, signed opinions may encourage such rhetorical flourish-
es and thus promote the Court's educative role.
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